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The term ‘‘genocide’’ has been commonly used, particularly in political dialogue,
to describe atrocities of great diversity, magnitude, and character. Yet the prospect
of the term’s arising in policy making too often imposes an intimidating brake
on effective responses. The political use of the term should be separated from its
legal definition as a crime of individual responsibility. Governments and
international organizations should be liberated to apply the term ‘‘genocide’’
more readily within a political context so as to publicly describe precursors
of genocide and react rapidly either to prevent or to stop mass killings or other
seeming acts of genocide. They should not be constrained from acting by
the necessity of a prior legal finding that the crime of genocide in fact has occurred
or is occurring and, once that legal finding has been made, that governments
are somehow obligated to use military force in response. There also is a critical need
for a new term—‘‘atrocity crimes’’—and a new field of international law—atrocity
law—to achieve a similar objective, namely, to enable public and academic
discourse to describe genocide, crimes against humanity (including ethnic
cleansing), and war crimes with a single term that is easily understood
by the public and accurately reflects the magnitude and character of the crimes
adjudicated before international and hybrid criminal tribunals and of
the law being applied by such tribunals, governments, and international
organizations. The purpose would be to simplify and yet render more
accurate both public dialogue and legal terminology describing genocide and
other atrocity crimes.
In this article I advance two proposals. First, there is a critical need to liberate
governments and international organizations from the genocide factor, by which
I mean to enable them to readily identify precursors of genocide without being
constrained by the legal requirements that must be met to properly identify the crime
of genocide. Second, I believe it is essential that we transform the terminology used in
scholarship, public documents, and public dialogue regarding the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity (including ethnic cleansing), and war crimes into a more
adaptable and accurate vehicle for the collective description of these crimes, and that
the relevant term should be ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ while the associated discipline should be
described as ‘‘atrocity law.’’
Liberating Governments and International Organizations
from the Genocide Factor
This topic presents a very difficult challenge. On the one hand, I will argue that
governments and international organizations, particularly the United Nations, need
to be liberated to apply the term ‘‘genocide’’ more readily in describing and reacting to
mass killings that appear to have genocidal intent—whether occurring over a short or
a long period—rather than being constrained by the necessity of a legal finding that,
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in fact, the crime of genocide has occurred or is occurring. In other words, I want to
draw a distinction between the political application of the term ‘‘genocide’’ and the
legal application of that term. Beyond that, the historical application of the term has
far-reaching but different ramifications from its political and legal applications.
On the other hand, I will argue in my second proposal that we need to go even
further and describe as ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ a grouping of crimes that includes genocide
but is not confined to that particular crime. In short, we need to simplify and, indeed,
render more accurate both public dialogue and legal terminology about such crimes. At
present, there is far too much confusion and garbled terminology about what is in fact
occurring in an atrocity zone.
These two arguments might appear, at first glance, to be at cross purposes. How
can we liberate the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ while at the same time sharpening its
precise application within the realm of international politics and law? To answer that
question, one might begin by focusing on the political application of the term that
merits a liberating influence.
Raphael Lemkin recognized the need for a new term to describe the type of human
destruction that no other legal term had adequately covered up through World War II,
and his introduction of the term ‘‘genocide’’ filled a gap in terminology that has had a
profound impact on law, culture, history, and politics since the late 1940s.1 But the
term ‘‘genocide’’ has proved insufficient and even, at times, counterproductive. The
range of criminal conduct that involves assaults on civilian populations and the misuse
of military power in armed conflict extends far beyond the relatively narrow confines
of the crime of genocide. Yet the term has been commonly used, particularly in political
dialogue, to describe atrocities of great diversity, magnitude, and character. Political
officials and observers have reached a stage where every mass killing, whether
immediate or drawn out over long periods, soon evokes the language of genocide
and its all too often intimidating brake on effective responses. As an almost perverse
methodology, governments and institutions seem incapable of responding effectively
to atrocities because these have not yet been determined to be genocide. If and when
such events are painstakingly defined as genocide, the same governments and
organizations are paralyzed, prevented from acting by the presumption that any action
will trigger that nation’s or organization’s legal responsibility to commit enough
personnel and resources, and stay the course long enough, to defeat the forces of
genocide. Effective action in the face of genocide, in contrast to cautious inaction,
can also challenge precepts of international law prohibiting the use of military
force or other punitive measures without, for example, explicit Security Council
enforcement authorization under chapter VII of the UN Charter.
I witnessed this phenomenon in the US government and at the United Nations
many times during my public service in the Clinton administration. During the early
years of the administration, officials seemed incapable of definitive action unless and
until genocide was determined to have occurred, and even then action was problematic
because either too much time had elapsed, and the killing had subsided, or the
larger responsibility any timely and effective response might trigger was too much
to shoulder politically. Probable genocide in Burundi in the fall of 1993 evoked no
response at all. Genocide in Rwanda in 1994 generated a pathetic and disastrously
delayed response. Genocide in southern Sudan throughout the 1990s led only to
diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. Genocide in the Balkans during the early 1990s
generated many diplomatic, humanitarian, judicial, and peacekeeping responses, but
very little that proved effective until a single genocidal event, the Srebrenica massacre
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in July 1995, finally triggered decisive military actions leading to the Dayton Accords
later that year. Probable genocide in the southern marshes of Iraq during the 1990s
colored a tough US policy toward Iraq during those years but resulted only in
sustaining the no-fly zone over the south and the UN sanctions regime, rather than
spurring intervention to reverse the genocidal policies of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Possible genocide in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s prompted
only diplomatic and ultimately UN peacekeeping initiatives, but the killing there
continues to this day, and no one is volunteering to trump the peacekeeping effort with
a humanitarian intervention. Even in Kosovo in 1999, when genocide appeared to be a
strong possibility, NATO’s response was confined to air power rather than invoking
the combined might of air and ground power, which might have averted further killing
by Serb military and paramilitary forces.
Since February 2003 the United States and the international community have
faced a similar challenge with respect to the situation in Darfur, Sudan. Once again,
action initially hinged on a finding of genocide, which the US government arrived at by
September 2004, albeit some eighteen months after the killing and ethnic cleansing
began in Darfur.2 (This was about how long it took for the Clinton administration, once
in office, to arrive at a similar conclusion regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina.) Yet
the term ‘‘genocide’’ has proved quite daunting, perhaps even more so once it was so
determined. One wonders whether the Bush administration remains fearful that, if it
were to act effectively on the evidence of genocide, it would trigger an unacceptable
responsibility to go the full distance to stop genocide in Darfur. Why confront genocide
head-on in Darfur if the result would create intolerable pressure on the United States
to shoulder the full, or nearly full, responsibility of genocide prevention in that
region—perhaps more so during the next crisis—as well as the risk of contravening the
UN Charter and customary international law on the use of force?
Governments, as opposed to prosecutors and courts, need to understand and apply
the term ‘‘genocide’’ largely in a preventive rather than a criminal context. It has
become folly of the most profound character to insist that a government, or the UN
Security Council, must first take the time and effort to determine, under international
criminal law, that the crime of genocide has been committed before taking military
action or, if it can work quickly enough, diplomatic or economic measures to stop what
might be, but may turn out not to be, genocide.
The article I obligation under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) that contracting parties ‘‘undertake to prevent and to
punish’’ the crime of genocide3 cannot possibly be met unless governments, and the
international or regional organizations through which they sometimes prefer to act,
respond on the basis of political, not legal, judgments about what is actually occurring
in the field. Those political judgments may be flawed, based on initial intelligence and
open-source reporting from the field that may prove erroneous over time; they may be
driven more by the urgency of a violent situation than by rigorous legal scrutiny of the
intentions and actions of individuals throughout the chain of command. A government
may be disproved in its initial assessment that another government, a separatist
movement, or a militia group has committed genocide. Perhaps the violence turns
out to be crimes against humanity. But unless there is some fairly flexible policy
that governments can employ, without attracting charges of character assassination,
to allege what appears to be an emerging genocide and then respond vigorously to
stop it, the academic discourse and political rhetoric about preventing and stopping
genocide will continue to be detached from reality.
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Governments should be liberated to describe quickly and publicly the precursors
of genocide that may ultimately establish the crime of genocide but, at a minimum,
should alert the world to the need to react in a timely manner to prevent further
destruction of innocent human life, whether in times of armed conflict or in times
of internal repression. This, of course, is only one facet of genocide prevention, namely,
the terminology employed, and what is proposed in this article supplements the
many existing proposals on genocide prevention and how to achieve it operationally.
Governments, international and regional organizations, and the media should regard
the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ as significant on a political, not legal, level. The term
is useful, pragmatic, and sufficiently diplomatic to be employed without necessarily
triggering some of the intimidating consequences of charges of genocide. It reflects
a judgment that precursors of events that may constitute the crime of genocide are
apparent. The recognition of precursors of genocide may put just enough pressure
about possible genocide in the public domain to encourage governments and relevant
international and regional organizations to respond faster and more effectively,
without the almost paralyzing pressure that builds with the bald use of the term
‘‘genocide.’’
In April 1999, I had the opportunity to articulate a similar term, ‘‘indicators
of genocide,’’ during the opening days of the Kosovo conflict of that period, when
Serb military and paramilitary forces were crossing into Kosovo and unleashing
violent ethnic cleansing and murderous assaults on the Kosovar Albanian population.
There is some value in examining precisely what the Clinton administration did at
that time that led to the use of the term ‘‘indicators of genocide.’’ I have reached
the conclusion since then that an alternative term, ‘‘precursors of genocide,’’ would be a
more appropriate one to use in the future. The term ‘‘indicators of genocide’’ has
evolved to denote the many political, sociological, economic, military, and diplomatic
events that occur long before actual genocide takes place and which point to trends
that may erupt into genocide at some point in the future. This is a vital exercise, and
one that I engaged in intensively as chair of the US government’s Atrocities Prevention
Inter-Agency Working Group in 1999 and 2000, working closely with academic experts
and the intelligence community on various schematic diagrams of such indicators
of genocide. But the exercise has been refined since then to give the term ‘‘indicators’’
a far more rigorous lock on a host of factors, some with long lead time, leading to
genocide.
The term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ refers to those events occurring immediately
prior to and during possible genocide that can point to an ultimate legal judgment of
genocide but which should be recognized and used in a timely manner to galvanize
international action to intervene, be it diplomatically, economically, or militarily. My
primary concern is to employ a term that stimulates, rather than retards, effective
action by governments and international organizations, particularly the United
Nations, to stem the tide of genocide (whether or not, as a matter of law, what unfolds
in the field is ultimately concluded to be genocide). But in 1999, as a government
official struggling with dynamic events unfolding, I turned to the more familiar term
‘‘indicators,’’ without making a rigorous distinction between long-term and short-term
phenomena related to genocide, and used it in largely the same context as one now
would use the term ‘‘precursors.’’
On 28 March 1999, I convened an inter-agency meeting of intelligence, political,
and military analysts and lawyers at the State Department for several hours of
discussion about how the events unfolding in Kosovo should be described publicly.
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In our review at the meeting, participants fairly rapidly concluded that Serb military
and paramilitary forces were committing crimes against humanity, given the
widespread and systematic character of the actions on the ground and the particular
violence being unleashed. We turned our attention to whether genocide was being
committed against the Kosovar Albanian population of Kosovo. As I later explained
in a press briefing on 9 April 1999, many of what I called ‘‘indicators of genocide’’ had
become apparent, and we believed it important, as a government, to state that
conclusion publicly. I described the indicators of genocide as including the then
historical context of the scorched-earth policy of death and destruction that had
already been recorded from the spring, summer, and fall of 1998 in Kosovo. I said,
The pattern was established in 1998. Indeed, one might consider what happened
in 1998, as a practice run for what was unleashed with remarkable speed and
thoroughness in the last few weeks [of March and April 1999]. Milosevic and the Serb
leadership are trying to bring to closure what they began in 1998. Now, the events of
the last few weeks exceed in magnitude and ferocity all that occurred in 1998. Without
question Serb assaults on the civilian population of Kosovo are widespread and
systematic.4
I reminded the press of the definition of crimes against humanity given in the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and of our
conclusion that many such crimes were being committed in Kosovo. I also pointed to
war crimes, including the destruction of civilian property.
I then extended the analysis into events that, when viewed within the context of
ongoing crimes against humanity and war crimes, pointed to the crime of genocide as
well. These indicators of genocide, occurring within a very short period (namely, the
previous three weeks), included5
1. The forced expulsion of large segments of the ethnic Albanian population, on
a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. I showed a map clearly
demonstrating that internal displacement and destruction of towns had
taken place almost entirely within the ethnic Albanian regions of Kosovo.
The map demonstrated the systematic way in which Kosovar Albanian
areas of Kosovo were assaulted ‘‘without much appreciable damage or
internally displaced populations from those areas that are largely populated
by Serbs.’’ As part of the destructive pattern, I noted the ‘‘forced removal of
Albanians from their homes at gun point; destruction of all official and
identifying documents; cramming of Albanians into trains; infliction of
unsanitary conditions on the trains, etc.’’ At the time we saw this kind of
conduct as reflecting, at a minimum, an article II(c) violation of the UNCG,
namely ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.’’
2. The detention and summary execution of military-aged men and mass
executions. Refugees had provided accounts of summary executions in at least
fifty towns and villages throughout Kosovo. I reported that ‘‘some accounts
refer to large numbers of Kosovars being killed in apparent massacres.’’ The
reported killings included targeting of intellectuals and leaders; separating
fighting-aged men from the group and killing them; causing serious bodily
harm; and mass executions. These events reflected the possibility of violations
of article II(a) (‘‘killing members of the group’’) and article II(d) (‘‘imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group’’) of the UNCG.
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3. The ‘‘burning and destruction of civilian homes and villages.’’ I presented
a map of Kosovo showing 220 sites of village destruction and said that,
as of 9 April, the number had increased to 250 sites and continued to rise.
(By mid-May 1999, the number had risen to well over 600.) I described the
character of destruction in the villages, the lack of any battle damage, and the
ethnic objective that appeared evident in the pattern of destruction. This
destruction pointed to article II(c) of the UNCG (‘‘deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part’’) as well as article II(b) (‘‘causing serious bodily or mental
harm to the members of the group’’). The US government had received many
reports of injuries and killings, many of a sadistic character, occurring during
these destructive sweeps of villages and towns, and officials logically inferred
from such events that serious mental harm was being inflicted on the fleeing
Kosovar Albanians.
I concluded this analysis by saying that ‘‘if you take the totality of this information that
we have acquired so far, we believe that it creates the basis for stating that there are
indicators of genocide unfolding in Kosovo.’’ Toward the end of the press briefing, I was
asked by a reporter what difference it made that I believed that what was unfolding on
the ground in Kosovo must reflect a planned operation executed pursuant to a policy.
I responded,
Let’s just say that obviously, if you can demonstrate a well thought out plan that has an
intent behind it, then—that’s why we point to indicators of genocide. But I want to
emphasize that regardless, you can have a very well planned campaign of crimes
against humanity, and there is no question that that’s what’s unfolded in Kosovo.6
Following use of the term ‘‘indicators of genocide,’’ the pressure from the media to
describe the Kosovo events as genocide dissipated. In other words, I firmly believe that
as long as there is a credible acknowledgment that genocide may be unfolding, the
media and the public will not insist on a definitive finding of genocide quickly or as
a predicate to action by a government or organization. They do want to know that the
genocide factor is acknowledged, recognized in some fashion, and kept in the forefront
of policy making and decision making during an atrocity. Where a government, like the
US government in 1999, can at least confirm that precursors of genocide are apparent,
and that the government or organization (as the case may be) is responding to those
precursors of genocide, then the pressure to conclude that the crime of genocide has
occurred or is occurring becomes far less significant. What becomes important is the
action being taken to prevent genocide rather than the search for the crime of genocide.
In the case of Kosovo, the debate in April and May 1999 focused on whether to send
in ground troops, not on whether the crime of genocide was taking place.
It is that determination of precursors of genocide that permits a political, as
opposed to legal, judgment to surface far more rapidly among public officials. As shown
by my own remarks during the Kosovo conflict, one can state more definitively the
legal judgment of crimes against humanity and war crimes in real time, but specific
intent requirements make legal judgments about genocide far more difficult to arrive
at quickly. Governments should be liberated to use ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ in their
public statements once those indicators begin to emerge from the field and thus trigger
the UNCG’s obligation, under article I, to act to prevent genocide as quickly and
effectively as possible. What logic would that obligation convey if a government had to
wait until the crime of genocide is established to prevent it?
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:3 December 2006
234
One may liken this to the significance of saying that acts of genocide have occurred,
which the United States and the United Nations did regarding the Rwandan genocide
of 1994 before the term ‘‘genocide’’ was used.7 But I counsel against use of that term,
as it is a critical component of any legal determination about the crime of genocide.
The legal determination combines an act of genocide with the specific intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a designated group. In the public dialogue, however, I do not
believe that any good purpose is served by distinguishing between ‘‘acts of genocide’’
and ‘‘genocide’’; in other words, in public officials’ either trying to manipulate the
distinction to avoid the responsibility to act or being held accountable by the media for
innocent application of the two terms interchangeably, or absent sophisticated
knowledge of the distinction in law. In contrast, precursors of genocide can be
associated more readily with evidence of an inferred intent, although a finding of such
intent should not be a prerequisite to the use of the term ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’
Preventive action need not, as a matter of law, involve military action. A whole
range of tools is available, including diplomatic initiatives; economic sanctions; judicial
initiatives with international, hybrid, or national criminal tribunals; and, under
relevant circumstances, military action. Some might argue that the requirements of
the UN Charter and customary international law must be strictly complied with prior
to the use of force in response to genocide. No state would have ratified the UNCG
if it imposed an unyielding obligation for that state to use military force on foreign
territory every time genocide is claimed. There is the option, under article VIII of the
UNCG, for any contracting party to ‘‘call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in article III.’’ But there is no obligation to do so, and, as we know,
there is no certainty whatsoever that the ‘‘competent organ’’ of the United Nations,
which typically would be the Security Council, would indeed take any such action.
The use of the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ does not guarantee that the political
and legal obstacles to a humanitarian intervention in any particular situation will be
lowered. But greater reliance by governments and organizations on using this term
might weaken the all-too-familiar resistance to effective action from governments
seeking and relying on the long lead time required for a finding of genocide before
there is real pressure to respond to genocidal events. There must be a more serious
effort to break the back of the myth that governments and organizations are paralyzed,
prevented from acting, until a finding of genocide has been made, however important
that finding will ultimately be for any criminal prosecution and for critical historical
accounts of what actually happened. The pathway to action against genocide must
be simplified; governments must not be frozen into inaction while awaiting legal
determinations about atrocities that appear genocidal in character but which would
require intensive legal scrutiny and historical research before the crime of genocide
could be established.
In the case of Darfur, the precursors of genocide had begun to appear by early
2003.8 Even if it had taken, say, six months for a recognition that precursors of
genocide were apparent to spur governments into action, there would have been
a much better chance of reversing genocidal developments in Darfur by the end of
2003, rather than placing the people of Darfur in the untenable position in which they
find themselves today. Instead, governments, the United Nations, and the African
Union appeared dependent on the word ‘‘genocide’’ as the predicate to responsible
reaction to the events unfolding in Darfur. On the one hand, it is to the credit of the US
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government that it undertook a genocide analysis of Darfur in 2004 and, in September
of that year, determined that genocide was indeed occurring in Darfur. But, on the
other hand, that exercise retarded effective action on the ground to prevent further
genocide until the finding was released, and, not surprisingly, the finding of genocide
has raised the legal stakes so high that the response of the United States remains
limited.
If the United States had simply concluded in 2003, or even early 2004, that
precursors of genocide were present in Darfur, and then effectively acted, unilaterally
or multilaterally, to ensure that the crime of genocide would not commence or continue
thereafter, many lives would doubtless have been saved. The genocide analysis of the
summer of 2004 could still have been productively undertaken, but the preventive
action would have long preceded it, rather than trailing in the aftermath. Similarly,
the International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Darfur might have benefited from
employing the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ rather than concluding, as it did, that the
crime of genocide and the necessary individual criminal responsibility had not been
established and, thus, genocide could not be determined.9 In fact, the commission
found no policy of genocide in Sudan.10 Such a finding is puzzling because the evidence
appears to show that there are precursors of a policy of genocide that must be
recognized at the political level first, and thus trigger an effective response, before
there is enough information and evidence for a legal finding of the crime of genocide.
Unfortunately, the commission approached its task as a strictly legal one, as if its only
function was to reach determinations that would be admissible in a court of law.
It could have fulfilled an important political role by looking for information that
would point to precursors of genocide, describe it simply as such, and avoid, at least
temporarily, any firm conclusions that the crime of genocide had in fact occurred.
Instead, it left the door wide open for the Sudanese government to capitalize on the
commission’s finding that there is no policy of genocide.11
The COI’s finding that there have been war crimes and crimes against humanity
in Darfur, however, is commendable, as is the commission’s emphasis that these
crimes must be taken as seriously as genocide and justice be rendered with as much
determination as if genocide had been determined.12 That focus on war crimes and
crimes against humanity, in particular, should have had more impact on governments,
the Security Council, and the media and public. As it stands, the commission’s January
2005 finding that there is no policy of genocide in Sudan may one day be shown to have
been so debilitating to preventive and responsive actions as to have limited the flow of
resources to the African Union monitoring force, retarded efforts to introduce combat
troops on Darfurian territory, shifted primary focus to continued (although greatly
disrupted) humanitarian aid efforts, and complicated largely futile diplomacy by the
United Nations.
The primary objective in relying on a more liberal understanding of genocide,
however, is to establish state responsibility far more readily than is currently
possible under the criminal-intent requirements of individual accountability. Such an
understanding would give policy makers the freedom to point a finger at a state’s
responsibility for actions that appear genocidal in real time, without having to prove
the direct responsibility of any individual leader or military commander for the crime
of genocide—which is what appears to have so constrained the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.
Thus, one could point to acts of genocide, as defined by articles II and III of the
UNCG, and express the political point that a government appears to be committing
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such acts of genocide, which it must be prevented from continuing to commit,
regardless of who, within such a government or military or militia force, can be shown
to demonstrate the requisite specific intent required to convict an individual for
the crime of genocide. The state and the government must be seen to be responsible
for the acts of genocide, and the witnesses of these events must, at the governmental
and organizational levels, be empowered to allege that at least precursors of genocide
are apparent and that they merit strong political and, in all likelihood, military
responses. This divide—between the political reality of genocide and the criminal
character of genocide—must be more broadly accepted if there is to remain any chance
of preventing genocide from continuing once it has erupted in an atrocity zone.
The Terminological Imperative of ‘‘Atrocity Crimes’’
and ‘‘Atrocity Law’’
Having argued that governments and organizations should be permitted to apply the
more flexible term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ to certain unfolding atrocities that point to
the crime of genocide, I believe that it is imperative that there be introduced an even
more adaptable terminology to describe genocide and other atrocities meriting effective
governmental and organizational responses.
During the first pursuit scene in the movie The Fugitive, Dr. Richard Kimble
(played by Harrison Ford) yells, ‘‘I didn’t kill my wife!’’; US Deputy Marshal Samuel
Gerard (played by Tommy Lee Jones) responds, ‘‘I don’t care!’’13 I am reminded of that
exchange every time the genocide factor rears its head on the international scene.
Claims abound that there is no genocide, or that the government has not committed
genocide, or that there must be a determination as to whether or not genocide has
occurred before any further action can be taken.
The collective response to any political leader, any military or militia commander,
or any international or regional organization denying the existence of genocide or
balking at taking effective action, on the premise that a finding of genocide is first
required, should be, ‘‘We don’t care!’’ We should not care, because the crimes that make
up the subject-matter jurisdiction of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals
constituted since 1993 range far beyond the crime of genocide, and rightly so.
These tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, the permanent International Criminal Court, the special War
Crimes Chambers in Bosnia, the Iraqi High Criminal Court, and the special
war crimes courts established in Kosovo and East Timor—have jurisdiction over
atrocity crimes.
Just as the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ should be more easily invoked by
governments when confronted with apparent acts of genocide, so too should public
officials, military officers, the media, and academics be free to describe genocide,
crimes against humanity (including the emerging crime of ethnic cleansing), and
serious war crimes as atrocity crimes meriting timely and effective responses
in political, military, and judicial terms. Repeatedly, all manner of official documents,
public statements, and scholarly works struggle to find the right terminology for the
range of crimes associated with atrocities, and one is left with fragmentary and very
often inaccurate descriptions of the range of crimes involved. Should one refer to
‘‘genocide and crimes against humanity,’’ or perhaps ‘‘violations of international
humanitarian law,’’ or perhaps ‘‘genocide and war crimes,’’ or perhaps ‘‘genocide,
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes,’’ or perhaps just
Genocide and Atrocity Crimes
237
‘‘genocide’’? A certain sloppiness has infected public dialogue, official documents, and
even scholarly works. A unifying term is needed to easily and accurately describe the
totality of these crimes.14
I plead for a new category of crimes called ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and for a new field of
international law that describes the law covering atrocity crimes, both in the realm
of state responsibility and in the domain of individual accountability. That body of
law I would describe as ‘‘atrocity law,’’ which essentially encompasses the law of the
international and hybrid criminal tribunals. Just as the term ‘‘genocide’’ originally
captured what Raphael Lemkin recognized as the essence of a particular crime against
humanity requiring special identification in public, legal, and historical terms, so too
does the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ describe a basket of particularly heinous crimes that
are suitable for criminal prosecution before international tribunals and national courts
and for which states and certain non-state organizations and groups should be held
responsible. Atrocity crimes also are collectively executed crimes of such magnitude
and destructive character as to be particularly prominent and logically inconsistent
with the protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and
security in an increasingly interdependent and sophisticated global society.
Atrocity Crimes
The word ‘‘atrocity’’ (or ‘‘atrocities’’) derives from Roman military law. It described
illegal acts performed pursuant to military orders, acts that today might also prove
illegal unless shielded by a modern application of the ‘‘defense of superior orders.’’
Professor Mark Osiel, in his well-documented book Obeying Orders, writes that ‘‘This
word [atrocities] never became a legal term of art, however, with a settled meaning
distinct from ordinary Latin. It no longer occupies any place within the formal
language of international military law.’’15 For that reason there is a fairly clean slate
upon which to use the word ‘‘atrocity’’ as a legal term, particularly in light of what
has occurred since the early 1990s and the popular usage of the term ‘‘atrocity’’ by
governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and the media.
Atrocity crimes fit the following profile of cumulative definitional characteristics,
all of which must exist for the term to be used accurately:
1. The crime must be of significant magnitude, meaning that its commission is
widespread or systematic or occurs as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes. The crime must involve a relatively large number of victims (e.g., a
fairly significant number of deaths or casualties), or impose other very severe
injury upon noncombatant populations (e.g., massive destruction of private
property), or subject a large number of combatants or prisoners of war to
violations of the laws and customs of war.
2. The crime may occur in time of war, or in time of peace, or in time of
violent societal upheaval of some organized character, and may be either
international or non-international in character.
3. The crime must be identifiable in conventional international criminal law as
the crime of genocide, a violation of the laws and customs of war, the crime of
aggression (if and when it is defined so as to give rise to clear individual
criminal culpability), the crime of international terrorism, a crime against
humanity (the precise definition of which has evolved in the development of
the criminal tribunals), or the emerging crime of ethnic cleansing.
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4. The crime must have been led, in its execution, by a ruling or otherwise
powerful elite in society (including rebel or terrorist leaders) who planned the
commission of the crime and were the leading perpetrators of the crime.
5. The law applicable to such crime, while it may impose state responsibility and
even remedies against states, is also regarded under customary international
law as holding individuals criminally liable for the commission of such crime,
thus enabling the prosecution of such individuals before a court duly
constituted for such purpose.
A crime that meets all five of these criteria would, in my view, be an atrocity crime.
In non-legal terms, these are high-impact crimes of severe gravity that are of an
orchestrated character, that shock the conscience of humankind, that result in a
significant number of victims, and that one would expect the international media and
the international community to focus on as meriting an international response holding
the lead perpetrators accountable before a competent court of law.
Here is the dilemma posed by the threshold of criminal conduct associated with
atrocity crimes. This issue has been confronted with genocide, which in a technical
sense can be found on the basis of the specific intent to kill one member of a designated
group but which, in practice and in the enforcement of the law, requires a larger
number of victims. Terms that describe the requirement well are ‘‘significant
magnitude,’’ ‘‘high threshold,’’ ‘‘extreme gravity,’’ and ‘‘significant numbers.’’ The
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court refers to ‘‘unimaginable atrocities
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,’’ ‘‘such grave crimes [as] threaten the
peace, security and well-being of the world,’’ and ‘‘the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole.’’16
The resulting substantiality test provides a better understanding of atrocity
crimes and the magnitude required to so classify them. There exists an ever-growing
jurisprudence on the meaning of the terms ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and
‘‘war crimes,’’ and one part of that exercise before the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) has been to clarify the
substantiality test that must be met.
With respect to genocide, the ICTR held in the Akayesu case that actual
extermination of a group in its entirety is not required and that ‘‘a person could be
found guilty of genocide without necessarily having to establish that genocide had
taken place throughout the country concerned.’’17 But the ICTR Trial Chamber also
held, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment, that the reference to ‘‘in part’’ in the
legal requirement of ‘‘intent to destroy in whole or in part,’’ found in both the ICTR
Statute and the UNCG, ‘‘requires the intention to destroy a considerable number
of individuals who are part of the group.’’18 In the Bagilishema judgment, the Trial
Chamber agreed
with the statement of the International Law Commission, that ‘‘the intention must be to
destroy the group as such, meaning as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely
some individuals because of their membership in [a] particular group.’’ Although the
destruction sought need not be directed at every member of the targeted group, the
Chamber considers that the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part
of the group.19
The ICTY Trial Chamber held in the Krstic judgment that ‘‘an intent to destroy only part
of the group must nevertheless concern a substantial part thereof, either numerically
or qualitatively.’’20 In Jelisic, the Trial Chamber held that ‘‘it is widely acknowledged
that the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the group.’’21
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One of the US understandings to its ratification of the UNCG was to qualify
‘‘destruction of part of a group’’ as meaning a ‘‘substantial part’’ of that group.22
That understanding has now, for all intents and purposes, become established
international law.
The ICTY, in its Jelisic decision, also elaborated two types of the substantiality
test:
Genocidal intent may . . . be manifest in two forms. It may consist of desiring the
extermination of a large number of the members of the group, in which case it would
constitute an intention to destroy a group en masse. However, it may also consist of the
desired destruction of a more limited number of persons selected [i.e., leadership
of the group] for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival
of the group as such. This would then constitute an intention to destroy the group
‘‘selectively.’’23
In its Jelisic judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled that ‘‘genocide may be
perpetrated in a limited geographic zone’’; for example, it may be ‘‘limited to the size of
a region or . . . a municipality.’’24 In Krstic, moreover, the court found that
the physical destruction may target only a part of the geographically limited part of the
larger group because the perpetrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction
as sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic area at
issue.25
In the Appeals Chamber judgment of Krstic, the substantiality requirement
for genocide was a central finding regarding the Srebrenica massacre. The court
found that the ‘‘part’’ must be a substantial part of the group; the part targeted
must be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole. The
court supported the Jelisic test of targeting at least a substantial part of the group,
as well as the test, developed in the Sikirica judgment, that there must be
evidence of an intention to destroy a substantial number relative to the total
population of the group and an intention that there be an impact on the overall
survival of the group.26
The Appeals Chamber also noted that the substantiality requirement is supported
by scholarly opinion. It cited Lemkin’s own view that the killing must be substantial,
or on a mass scale. And it noted the International Law Commission’s view that the
crime of genocide requires the intent to destroy at least a substantial part of a
particular group. The court then held that
The intent requirement under article 4 of the statute is therefore satisfied
where evidence shows that the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a
substantial part of the protected group. The number of individuals targeted should
be evaluated not only in absolute terms but also in relation to the overall size of the
entire group.27
The court subsequently focused on the issue of geographical area, finding that
the importance of the 40,000 Muslims in Srebrenica is not captured solely by
their numbers: ‘‘The capture and ethnic purification of Srebrenica would severely
undermine the military efforts of the Bosnian Muslim state to ensure its viability.
Elimination of the enclave would have accomplished the goal of purifying the entire
region of its Muslim population.’’28 Therefore, Srebrenica was important ‘‘due to its
prominence in the eyes of both the Bosnian Muslims and the international community
(as a ‘safe area’).’’29 Thus the ambit of the genocidal enterprise in Krstic was limited to
the area of Srebrenica.
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The Appeals Chamber also inferred from the actual killing of the protected
group, men of military age, the intent to destroy a substantial part of the targeted
group, the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica. The defense argued that ethnic
cleansing is not genocide. The Trial Chamber had rejected the defense’s argument
that the killing of these men was motivated solely by the desire to eliminate them
as a potential military threat; the extermination was not driven solely by a military
rationale. The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber was entitled to consider
the long-term impact that the elimination of 7,000 to 8,000 men from Srebrenica
would have on the survival of that community. Such killings potentially consigned
the community to extinction, and the court considered this the type of physical
destruction that the UNCG is designed to prevent. Furthermore, the forcible transfer
could be an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the
Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica, as it prevented the Muslim community
from reconstituting itself. Killing women or children would have inflamed public
opinion.30
The Appeals Chamber found that while the intent to commit genocide must be
supported by the factual matrix, the offense of genocide does not require proof that the
perpetrator chose the most efficient method to accomplish his objective of destroying
the targeted part. In this case, the perpetrators adopted the method that would allow
them to implement the genocidal design while minimizing the risk of retribution. The
fact that forcible transfer does not, in and of itself, constitute a genocidal act did not
preclude the Trial Chamber from relying on it as evidence of the intentions of members
of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic). The genocidal
intent may be inferred, among other facts, from evidence of ‘‘other culpable acts
systematically directed against the same group.’’31
The Appeals Chamber also found that where direct evidence of genocidal intent is
absent, such intent may still be inferred from the factual circumstances of the crime. In
the case of Srebrenica, the factual circumstances permit the inference that the killing
of the Bosnian Muslim men was done with genocidal intent. The scale of the killing,
combined with the VRS Main Staff ’s awareness of the detrimental consequences it
would have on the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica and with the other
actions the Main Staff took to ensure that community’s physical demise, is a sufficient
factual basis for the finding of specific intent.32
The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the gravity of genocide is reflected in the
stringent requirements that must be satisfied for a conviction: ‘‘The demanding proof
of specific intent and the showing that the group was targeted for destruction in its
entirety or in substantial part, guard against a danger that convictions for this crime
will be imposed lightly.’’33 The court continued,
By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces
committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the 40,000 Bosnian Muslims living in
Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They
stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of
their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed
them solely on the basis of their identity. The Bosnian Serb forces were aware, when
they embarked on this genocidal venture, that the harm they caused would continue to
plague the Bosnian Muslims.34
The Appeals Chamber stated ‘‘unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate
terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its
proper name: genocide.’’35
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Although the Krstic Trial Chamber rejected only the cultural or social destruction
of a group as constituting genocide, it pointed out
that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous
attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well,
attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically
destroy the group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as
evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and
houses belonging to members of the group.36
The magnitude of such destruction can thus influence reaching a determination of
genocide. The Krstic Appeals Chamber noted the Trial Chamber’s observation and did
not reject the conclusion that such destruction can be taken into account as evidence of
intent to destroy the group.37
If one examines the substantiality requirement for crimes against humanity, one
finds that the tribunals have established levels of gravity requisite to merit description
as ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ Interestingly, article 5 of the ICTY Statute, which incorporates
crimes against humanity into the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, provides no
literal substantiality requirement. But the ICTY jurisprudence does. First, the court
has found that
It is sufficient to show that enough individuals were targeted in the course of the attack,
or that they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy the Chamber that the attack was
in fact directed against a civilian ‘‘population,’’ rather than against a limited and
randomly selected number of individuals.38
The ICTY also reads into article 5 the requirement that the attack be
‘‘either widespread or systematic in nature.’’39 In Kordic and Cerkez, the court
found that ‘‘a crime may be widespread or committed on a large scale by the
‘cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane
act of extraordinary magnitude.’ ’’40 In Blaskic, the Trial Chamber ruled that
‘‘the widespread characteristic refers to the scale of the acts perpetrated and to
the number of victims.’’41 Also in Blaskic, the court articulated the elements of
a ‘‘systematic’’ attack:
The systematic character refers to four elements which . . . may be expressed as follows:
(1) the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is
perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute
or weaken a community; (2) the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large
scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and continuous commission
of inhumane acts linked to one another; (3) the preparation and use of significant
public or private resources, whether military or other; (4) the implication of high-level
political and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the
methodical plan.42
In Kunarac, Kovac, and Vokovic and in Jelisic, the ICTY emphasized that factors used
to assess ‘‘widespread or systematic’’ include ‘‘the number of victims’’43 and ‘‘the
employment of considerable financial, military or other resources and the scale or
the repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the violence committed against
a particular civilian population.’’44
The crime of extermination, a long-standing crime against humanity, should
be of most interest to scholars of genocide because it constitutes an alternative
charge in an indictment that comes closest to the crime of genocide without
having to prove the specific intent required for genocide. The Kristic Trial
Chamber held that the definition ‘‘should be read as meaning the destruction of a
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numerically significant part of the population concerned.’’45 In Vasiljevic, the Trial
Chamber found
that criminal responsibility for ‘‘extermination’’ only attaches to those individuals
responsible for a large number of deaths, even if their part therein was remote or
indirect. Responsibility for one or for a limited number of such killings is insufficient.46
The Krstic Trial Chamber offered a caveat, however: ‘‘While extermination generally
involves a large number of victims, it may be constituted even where the number of
victims is limited.’’47 The Vasilijevic Trial Chamber further required that
‘‘extermination must be collective in nature rather than directed towards singled out
individuals.’’48
Regarding the crime of persecution, which also can be a key element of genocidal
intent, the ICTY, in Kordic and Cerkez, was careful to invoke the substantiality test,
listing by example two acts that ‘‘do not constitute persecution as a crime against
humanity because they do not rise to the same level of gravity as the other crimes
against humanity enumerated in Article 5’’ of the ICTY Statute. Those two examples
are ‘‘encouraging and promoting hatred on political grounds’’ and ‘‘dismissing and
removing Bosnian Muslims from government.’’49
The residual clause listing ‘‘other inhumane acts’’ must satisfy the substantiality
test as well. In Naletilic and Martinovic, the ICTY defined ‘‘other inhumane acts’’ as
acts that do not fall within any of the other sub-clause of Article 5 of the Statute but are
sufficiently similar in gravity to the other enumerated crimes . . . . As constituting
crimes against humanity, these acts must also be widespread or systematic.50
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, which incorporates crimes against humanity in
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTR, explicitly invokes the language of
‘‘a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.’’ In the Akayesu
Trial Chamber decision, the court found that ‘‘the concept of ‘widespread’ may be
defined as massive, frequent, large scale, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a mutiplicity of victims.’’51 In Kayishema and
Ruzindana, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that ‘‘a widespread attack is one that
is directed against a multiplicity of victims.’’52 The attack on a civilian population
does not mean that the entire population of a given State or territory must be victimized
by these acts in order for the acts to constitute a crime against humanity . . . . Instead
the ‘‘population’’ element is intended to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus
excludes single or isolated acts which, although possibly constituting crimes under
national penal legislation, do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity.53
The specific crime of extermination requires that ‘‘the actor participates in the mass
killing of others or in the creation of conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of
others, through his act(s) or omission(s).’’54
Finally, the substantiality test for war crimes is of a different character.
Technically, there is no real substantiality test, other than that found in the 1949
Geneva Conventions for what constitutes a grave breach, and even then the issue
pertains to the individual victim or victims rather than to any particularly substantial
number of victims. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute incorporates into the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the court the commission of ‘‘serious violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions . . .’’ This has been interpreted to mean ‘‘grave consequences
for the victim.’’55 The ICTY has mirrored this finding. In Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic,
a violation of the laws or customs of war ‘‘must be serious, that is to say, it must
constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve
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grave consequences for the victim.’’56 Yet no indictment, and certainly no conviction,
before either tribunal on war-crimes charges has sought to proceed with respect to
isolated or singular violations of the Geneva Conventions or of the laws and customs
of war. There is always a larger context to the war-crimes charges that involves
a substantial degree of illegal conduct.
There are also important substantiality requirements built into the statutes of
the permanent International Criminal Court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. With respect to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, US negotiators, myself included, sought
to require that war crimes be committed ‘‘as part of a plan or policy and as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes.’’ But we were rebuffed by other delegations
and ultimately settled on ‘‘war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’’57 This reflected
the interests of governments to ensure that the 1949 Geneva Conventions would not
become narrowly construed to apply only to planned or large-scale commissions of war
crimes but could also be enforced against perpetrators of individual grave breaches.
Yet the inference in all that was discussed and anticipated in the practice of
the International Criminal Court was for a substantiality test to be met either through
the execution of a policy or plan to commit war crimes (which infers a multiplicity of
criminal acts) or through a large-scale commission of war crimes.
Atrocity Law
There has been a revolution in international humanitarian and criminal law since
1993. In conventional legal terminology, however, no term describes precisely what
the international and hybrid criminal tribunals have the jurisdiction to prosecute. The
crimes in question are not only genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes;
they need a unifying term. The law applied by the criminal tribunals is not only
international humanitarian law, not only international criminal law, not only
international human-rights law, not only military law, and not only serious crimes
under international law.
The law of the criminal tribunals is uniquely crafted, the enforcement mechanism
is uniquely conceived, and the political mandate of each of these courts is uniquely
tailored. They need a truly relevant term to describe the reality of their jurisdiction
and their role in framing legal responses to war crimes, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and other heinous crimes.
The international community has faced this situation before. The crime of genocide
identified by Raphael Lemkin arose from his concern that the Holocaust could not
be properly defined or prosecuted as simply a crime against humanity. The constituent
parts of the crime were unique, and conventional international law did not address
those unique characteristics of intent, target, and context. With Lemkin’s persever-
ance, the UNCG defined the new crime of genocide.
Similarly, today we are confronted with an inadequate lexicon for the crimes and
law that underpin the criminal tribunals. In a fundamental way, the relatively rapid
establishment of these criminal tribunals has outstripped the capacity of the law
to remold itself into an easily identifiable legal weapon for them to wield. It is no
idle matter, this quest for terminology. Getting the terminology right is part of
the accuracy and integrity of the process, and it is part of the job of selling to the public
the credibility and utility of these judicial institutions. If public support for
international prosecution and military responses to atrocity crimes is lost because
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what is described appears threatening or incomprehensible to the average person, then
the entire venture will be undermined.
Atrocity law is the law applied to atrocity crimes; it is drawn from several
disciplines of international law: international criminal law, international humanitar-
ian law, international human-rights law, and the law of war; and it is applied
primarily by international and hybrid criminal tribunals.
An unfortunate inaccuracy appears repeatedly in UN Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions, in legislation by the US Congress and European
parliaments, and in the public pronouncements of governments and non-governmental
organizations. The body of law purportedly covering atrocity crimes is typically
referred to as ‘‘international humanitarian law’’ and the crimes described as
‘‘violations of international humanitarian law.’’ Such is not necessarily the case,
however. More often, the relevant criminal conduct engages several fields of
established law—international humanitarian law, international criminal law, inter-
national human-rights law, the laws and customs of war, and military law. For
any particular situation of atrocities and the subject-matter jurisdiction of any
particular criminal tribunal, however, there is one field of law—atrocity law—that
overlaps parts of each of these separate fields of law but never encompasses any one of
them entirely.
Briefly, international humanitarian law establishes norms to protect certain
categories of persons and property and prohibits attacks against them during the
course of an armed conflict of an international or non-international character. But it
can exclude some parts of the laws of war whose primary purpose is not humanitarian,
and it does not concern either genocide or crimes against humanity that occur outside
the ambit of armed conflict. Most of international humanitarian law cannot be
prosecuted against an individual and concerns state practice and state responsibility
in armed conflicts.
The conventions of international criminal law range far beyond atrocities. Less
than half of the at least twenty-four categories of international criminal law pertain
to atrocities. International criminal law does not incorporate most of international
humanitarian law or international human rights law. While international criminal
law will always apply to atrocity crimes and atrocity law, it would be deeply misleading
to use the term to describe the kind of actions and the kind of law that are of direct
concern to international criminal tribunals. The term fails the tests of magnitude,
of targeting the leading perpetrators, and of isolating only those crimes accurately
described as ‘‘atrocities.’’
International human-rights law is inappropriate to criminal tribunals, as it
has traditionally, in its relatively short history, concerned the political responsibility
of states for violations against individual victims, not the criminal responsibility
of individual perpetrators. Until relatively recently, human-rights law did not
seek to govern the conduct of states during warfare, which is the circumstance
that so often accompanies atrocities. There is now considerable tension between
human-rights law and the law of war as the former seeks to intrude more
aggressively into the domain of warfare. Much of human-rights law requires
the breathing space afforded by the absence of penal provisions. Atrocity law, as
I would define it, requires criminal sanction, and it concerns only those human-rights
violations that can be prosecuted as crimes and are committed on a scale and
in circumstances that only scratch the surface of the full range of human-rights
violations and law.
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Military or court-martial law and, in most respects, the law of war pertain solely to
war crimes and, through generically relevant crimes such as murder, to crimes against
humanity and genocide. But it is an entirely unsatisfactory body of law to cover the
criminality of individual perpetrators of atrocity crimes, particularly non-military
perpetrators.
The following characteristics of atrocity law draw from the international and
hybrid criminal tribunals:
 No two criminal tribunals share exactly the same law. The law is selected and
edited to conform to the circumstances of the crimes and to the context within
which they were committed. In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the special courts in
Kosovo and East Timor, and the Iraqi High Criminal Court, domestic law
also figures prominently. In fact, the principle of complementarity in the Rome
Statute of the ICC invites a significant and potentially exclusive role for
national criminal law in achieving the objectives of the permanent court.
 Personal jurisdiction is limited either implicitly, by virtue of the substantiality
test required of the crime and, one might argue, the practical limitations of the
tribunal (e.g., the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR), or explicitly by the terms of the
statute itself (e.g., the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).
 Some categories of atrocity law have evolved and acquired greater precision
with more recently established tribunals.
 One can look beyond the statutes of the tribunals to case law, as for the
substantiality test, for a further understanding of atrocity crimes and
atrocity law.
If ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ were to become part of the lexicon for the
crimes and law of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals, these terms would
help with several issues:
 The criminal tribunals are having the perhaps unintended effect of encouraging
a shift away from state responsibility toward individual criminal responsibility,
and a shift from low-magnitude crimes to high-magnitude crimes as the focus of
judicial enforcement. It is easier to charge a state with the commission of
atrocity crimes than it is to charge a particular type of atrocity crime. While the
criminal tribunals rightly act with great precision to prosecute the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes, there remains a
need to elevate once again the responsibility of governments not to commit
these crimes. An effective way of doing this would be to use the language of
atrocity crimes to describe what a state appears responsible for committing,
whether or not a specific atrocity crime can be identified quickly.
 Use of the terms ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ would enhance the unique
character and accuracy of the conventional terminology, which otherwise risks
becoming blurred with overlapping applications and incomplete descriptions of
what the criminal tribunals actually enforce. In other words, one would not
have to misconstrue the terms ‘‘international humanitarian law,’’ ‘‘criminal
law,’’ or ‘‘the law of war’’ to describe the applicable law of the criminal tribunals.
Likewise, one would not need to misconstrue ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against
humanity,’’ or ‘‘war crimes’’ to describe the killings, violence, and destruction
actually taking place.
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 The presumption of the criminal tribunals is that the leading perpetrators
of the atrocity crimes will be prosecuted before the criminal tribunal,
whereas the mid- and lower-level perpetrators will either be prosecuted
before competent domestic courts or handled through a non-judicial
mechanism, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, determined
at the national or local level. By focusing on atrocity crimes and atrocity
law in describing the jurisdiction of the criminal tribunals, one can more
clearly delineate between the international and domestic mechanisms of
justice that are evolving. Theoretically, of course, a criminal tribunal should
have the legal tools to prosecute the foot soldier for a grave breach of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, or a local policeman for participating in mass
rape during a genocidal rampage. But the international community and
national governments are drawing a different line, using scarce resources
for criminal tribunals that prosecute crimes meeting the criteria that have
been set forth and encouraging alternative mechanisms at the national level
for the typically much larger number of mid- and low-level perpetrators.
Atrocity crimes and atrocity law better distinguish between those two levels
of justice and rehabilitation.
 Humanitarian intervention and the more recent articulation of a responsibility
to protect civilian populations at risk,58 both of which remain controversial
areas of international law, might be better understood and more supportable
politically if the objective of the intervention or action to protect were to end or
prevent an atrocity crime, rather than having politicians, military commanders,
and their government lawyers and spokespersons claim that such massive
military measures are required to confront war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or violations of international humanitarian law. The crime of
genocide can be left untethered as a powerful public rationale for humanitarian
intervention or an action to protect. But short of literally calling the situation
a genocide, which experience demonstrates is a struggle for governments and
international organizations, there is need for a powerful and accurate term that
can be readily understood as justifying the extraordinary and legally
controversial initiative of a humanitarian intervention or action to protect
civilian populations at risk. That term is ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ The technical use of
‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ or ‘‘war crimes’’ may be accurate in
a particular situation, but humanitarian interventions and actions under the
principle of responsibility to protect require the building of popular support, as
well as international support, to sustain them in times of great crisis and to
preserve for the states involved the right and ability to intervene for
humanitarian purposes again. The public might better appreciate the need for
military intervention if the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ was used in association with
responses to clearly horrific and unacceptable assaults on civilian populations,
rather than legal terminology (particularly ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ ‘‘ethnic
cleansing,’’ ‘‘war crimes,’’ and even ‘‘genocide’’) that can be understood by
lawyers as extremely meaningful (and horrific) but to the public remains foggy
at best. The legality of any particular humanitarian intervention or action to
protect is a separate debate. But there is great utility for a more focused and
easily understood jurisdictional description—‘‘atrocity crimes’’—for
governments, international organizations, and criminal tribunals in relation to
atrocity prevention and termination.
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The next step might be to incorporate such terms in UN Security Council
resolutions and UN reports and in legislative resolutions, as well as pleadings,
decisions, and judgments of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals. There
would be considerable utility in forging a UN General Assembly resolution that would
recommit the international community to react swiftly to the commission of atrocity
crimes, which could be expressly stated as such in the resolution and then described as
including genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes. But it may take
a number of years of use of the term ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ particularly by political leaders
and leading scholars, and the continued unleashing of atrocities without effective
response, for such codification of the term to occur.59
Conclusion
The prospect of the term ‘‘genocide’’ arising in policy making too often puts an
intimidating brake on effective responses. I have argued here that the political use of
the term should be separated from its legal definition as a crime of individual
responsibility. Governments and international organizations should be liberated to
apply the term ‘‘genocide’’ more readily, within a political context, to publicly describe
precursors of genocide and react rapidly either to prevent or to stop mass killings
or other acts of genocide. Precursors of genocide are those events occurring
immediately prior to and during a possible genocide that can point to an ultimate
legal judgment of genocide but which should be recognized and used in a timely
manner to galvanize international action to intervene, whether diplomatically,
economically, or militarily. Policy makers should not be constrained from acting by
the necessity of a prior legal finding that the crime of genocide in fact has occurred or
is occurring and, once that legal finding has been made, that any such finding would
automatically obligate governments to use military force in response.
There also is a critical need for a new term—‘‘atrocity crimes’’—and a new field of
international law—atrocity law—to achieve a similar objective, namely, to enable
public and academic discourse to describe genocide, crimes against humanity
(including ethnic cleansing), and war crimes with a single term that is easily
understood by the public and accurately reflects the magnitude and character of the
crimes adjudicated before international and hybrid criminal tribunals and of the law
being applied in practice by such tribunals and by governments and international
organizations. The purpose would be to simplify and yet render more accurate both
public dialogue and legal terminology describing genocide and other atrocity crimes.
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